

## Republic of Italy

**Sovereign Ratings Group:**

David T Beers, Managing Director, London (44) 20-7176-7101; david\_beers@standardandpoors.com

### Table Of Contents

---

Major Rating Factors

Rationale

Outlook

Related Criteria And Research

# Republic of Italy

## Major Rating Factors

### Strengths:

- High levels of per capita GDP.
- Strong household and corporate balance sheets.
- Limited external imbalances.

### Sovereign Credit Rating

A/Negative/A-1

### Weaknesses:

- Weakening real and nominal growth prospects.
- What we view as significant political impediments to growth-enhancing reforms.
- High gross and net general government debt.
- Limited commitment to expenditure cuts under the current medium term fiscal programme.

## Rationale

The lowering of the long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Italy reflects our view of the Italian economy's weakening growth prospects and our view that Italy's fragile governing coalition and policy differences within parliament will likely continue to limit the government's ability to respond decisively to domestic and external macroeconomic challenges.

Under our recently updated sovereign ratings criteria, the "political" and "debt" scores are the primary contributors to the downgrade. The scores relating to the other elements of our methodology--economic structure, external, and monetary--did not contribute to the downgrade.

More subdued external demand, government austerity measures, and upward pressure on funding costs in both the public and private sectors will, in our opinion, likely result in weaker growth for the Italian economy compared with our May 2011 base-case expectations, when we revised the outlook to negative. We believe the reduced pace of Italy's economic activity to date will make the government's revised fiscal targets difficult to achieve. Furthermore, what we view as the Italian government's tentative policy response to recent market pressures suggests continuing future political uncertainty about the means of addressing Italy's economic challenges.

The government projects that its fiscal consolidation program will result in a cumulative fiscal consolidation of about €60 billion, overall, with the largest savings projected in 2012 and 2013 (see "Italy Delivers", <http://www.mef.gov.it/documenti/open.asp?idd=27880>).

However, we think that the government's projection of a €60 billion savings may not come to fruition for three primary reasons:

- First, as described below, we view Italy's economic growth prospects as weakening;
- Second, nearly two-thirds of the projected budgetary savings in the crucial 2011-2014 period rely on revenue increases in a country already carrying a high tax burden; and
- Third, market interest rates are anticipated to rise.

We expect that Italy's net general government debt burden will remain the key rating constraint for the foreseeable future. Under our base-case scenario (see table 1 below) we project such net debt to end-2011 to be at 117% of GDP, up from 100% of GDP in 2007. Under our current base case, the net debt burden would fall only slightly to 115% of GDP by 2014, a similar rate to the May 2011 downside scenario. By comparison, the current upside and downside cases incorporate modestly different trajectories for the net debt burden (see tables 2 and 3 below).

Our macroeconomic analysis also illustrates Italy's main credit weakness: Even under pressure, Italian political institutions, incumbent monopolies, public-sector workers, and public- and private-sector unions impede the government's ability to respond decisively to challenging economic conditions. For example, union opposition to the privatization of Alitalia in 2008 ended prospects for a takeover by Air France. Moreover, resistance in parliament in July 2011 led the government to drop proposals to liberalize professional services from its legislative agenda. Nontariff barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) are, in our view, the key reason behind Italy's relatively low inbound FDI stock. At about 16% of GDP, it is less than one-half that of either France or Spain (36% and 43% of GDP, respectively) and lower than that of Germany (27%), despite Italy's potential efficiency gains from economic scale within Europe's common market.

With elections due in 2013, and the government's parliamentary position tenuous, it is unclear what can be done to break the deadlock between these political institutions and the government. As a result, we believe that Italy remains vulnerable to heightened fiscal, economic, and financial downside risks.

We continue to score Italy as a high-income sovereign with a diversified economy and few external imbalances, albeit one with what we see as weaker growth prospects. In addition, we view both household and corporate balance sheets as being relatively strong, which should enable the government to tap local savings on a scale that could permit a more gradual fiscal adjustment than for some of its southern European neighbors. As of end-2010, Italy's non-bank sector remains in a substantial net external creditor position, while the public sector's net external liability is equivalent to €804 billion (52% of GDP). We note that Italy's current account deficit has widened recently, to over 10% of current account receipts, but we expect this will unwind.

## Outlook

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects Standard & Poor's view of risks to the government's fiscal targets over 2011-2014, as well as the uncertainties on the timely implementation of growth-enhancing reforms. In our view, these risks would result from weaker output growth than we currently assume in our revised base case. In addition, political gridlock could contribute to delayed policy responses to new macroeconomic challenges and result in significant fiscal slippages.

If one or more of these risks materializes, Italy's net general government debt could increase from its already high level. In that event, we could lower the long- and short-term ratings. We could also lower the ratings if, against our expectations, the current account deficit remained higher than 10% of current account receipts beyond 2013. This would occur if Italy's trade balance did not improve or if the income deficits continued to widen because of rising refinancing costs.

On the other hand, if the government manages to gather political support for implementing growth-enhancing structural reforms, which in turn increase prospects for a material reduction in the net public debt burden in the medium term, we could affirm the ratings at the current level.

**Table 1**

Italy (Republic of) -- Base-Case Assumptions								
Selected indicators								
(%)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011e	2012f	2013f	2014f
GDP per capita, \$US	35,788	38,519	35,160	33,995	35,680	37,975	38,720	39,509
Real GDP (% chg)	1.5	(1.3)	(5.2)	1.3	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.7
Real GDP per capita (% chg)	0.8	(2.1)	(5.9)	0.8	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2
General govt. balance/GDP	(1.8)	(3.0)	(5.7)	(4.9)	(4.5)	(2.9)	(1.8)	(1.7)
General govt. debt/GDP	103.6	106.3	116.1	119.0	121.4	122.4	121.4	120.0
Net general govt. debt/GDP	100.0	102.9	111.6	113.8	117.1	117.9	116.8	115.4
GG interest/GG revenues	10.8	11.2	9.9	9.7	10.6	11.6	12.4	12.8
Dom. credit private & NFPEs/GDP	107.1	111.9	117.6	119.5	119.6	119.5	119.9	120.3
CPI (% chg)	2.1	3.5	0.7	1.7	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Current account balance/GDP	(3.0)	(3.0)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(4.0)	(4.0)	(3.0)	(3.0)
Narrow net ext. debt/CARs	223.4	192.3	276.8	247.0	238.5	224.2	223.5	222.7

e--Estimate. f--Forecast. GG -- General government. CARs -- Current account receipts.

**Table 2**

Italy (Republic of) -- Positive Scenario Assumptions								
Selected indicators								
(%)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011e	2012f	2013f	2014f
GDP per capita, \$US	35,788	38,519	35,160	33,995	35,691	38,037	38,849	39,839
Real GDP (% chg)	1.5	(1.3)	(5.2)	1.3	0.8	0.6	0.9	1.2
Real GDP per capita (% chg)	0.8	(2.1)	(5.9)	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.6
General govt. balance/GDP	(1.8)	(3.0)	(5.7)	(4.9)	(4.4)	(2.7)	(1.6)	(1.5)
General govt. debt/GDP	103.6	106.3	116.1	119.0	121.3	122.0	120.5	118.4
Net general govt. debt/GDP	100.0	102.9	111.6	113.8	117.0	117.4	115.9	113.9
GG interest/GG revenues	10.8	11.2	9.9	9.7	10.5	11.6	12.2	12.4
Dom. credit private & NFPEs/GDP	107.1	111.9	117.6	119.5	119.6	119.3	119.7	120.1
CPI (% chg)	2.1	3.5	0.7	1.7	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Current account balance/GDP	(3.0)	(3.0)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(4.0)	(4.0)	(3.0)	(3.0)
Narrow net ext. debt/CARs	223.4	192.3	276.8	247.0	238.5	224.2	223.0	220.6

e--Estimate. f--Forecast. GG -- General government. CARs -- Current account receipts.

**Table 3**

Italy (Republic of) -- Negative Scenario Assumptions								
Selected indicators								
(%)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011e	2012f	2013f	2014f
GDP per capita, \$US	35,788	38,519	35,160	33,995	35,651	37,533	38,024	38,711
Real GDP (% chg)	1.5	(1.3)	(5.2)	1.3	0.6	(0.6)	0.1	0.5
Real GDP per capita (% chg)	0.8	(2.1)	(5.9)	0.8	0.2	(1.1)	(0.4)	(0.1)
General govt. balance/GDP	(1.8)	(3.0)	(5.7)	(4.9)	(4.4)	(3.0)	(2.0)	(1.9)
General govt. debt/GDP	103.6	106.3	116.1	119.0	121.4	123.9	123.7	122.7
Net general govt. debt/GDP	100.0	102.9	111.6	113.8	117.2	119.3	119.1	118.2
GG interest/GG revenues	10.8	11.2	9.9	9.7	10.6	12.0	13.0	13.7

**Table 3**

Italy (Republic of) -- Negative Scenario Assumptions (cont.)								
Dom. credit private & NFPEs/GDP	107.1	111.9	117.6	119.5	118.6	118.6	119.1	119.3
CPI (% chg)	2.1	3.5	0.7	1.7	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.8
Current account balance/GDP	(3.0)	(3.0)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(4.0)	(4.0)	(4.0)	(4.0)
Narrow net ext. debt/CARs	223.4	192.3	276.8	247.0	238.4	225.1	226.0	224.6

e--Estimate. f--Forecast. GG--General government. CARs--Current account receipts.

## Related Criteria And Research

- Italy Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'A/A-1' On Weaker Growth Prospects, Uncertain Policy Environment; Outlook Negative, Sept. 19, 2011
- Sovereign Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions, June 30, 2011
- Credit FAQ: Why We Revised The Outlook On Italy To Negative, May 23, 2011
- Research Update: Republic of Italy Outlook Revised To Negative On Risk Of Persistent High Debt Ratio; 'A+/A-1+' Ratings Affirmed, May 20, 2011
- Criteria For Determining Transfer And Convertibility Assessments, May 18, 2009

### Ratings Detail (As Of September 19, 2011)\*

#### Republic of Italy (Unsolicited Ratings)

Sovereign Credit Rating	A/Negative/A-1
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment	AAA
Senior Unsecured (3 Issues)	AAA

#### Sovereign Credit Ratings History

19-Sep-2011	A/Negative/A-1
20-May-2011	A+/Negative/A-1+
19-Oct-2006	A+/Stable/A-1+

\*Unless otherwise noted, all ratings in this report are global scale ratings. Standard & Poor's credit ratings on the global scale are comparable across countries. Standard & Poor's credit ratings on a national scale are relative to obligors or obligations within that specific country.

#### Additional Contact:

Sovereign Ratings; SovereignLondon@standardandpoors.com

This unsolicited rating(s) was initiated by Standard & Poor's. It may be based solely on publicly available information and may or may not involve the participation of the issuer. Standard & Poor's has used information from sources believed to be reliable based on standards established in our Credit Ratings Information and Data Policy but does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy, or completeness of any information used.

Copyright © 2011 by Standard & Poors Financial Services LLC (S&P), a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of S&P. The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P, its affiliates, and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions, regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P's opinions and analyses do not address the suitability of any security. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain non-public information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain credit-related analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, [www.standardandpoors.com](http://www.standardandpoors.com) (free of charge), and [www.ratingsdirect.com](http://www.ratingsdirect.com) and [www.globalcreditportal.com](http://www.globalcreditportal.com) (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at [www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees](http://www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees).